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Abstract 
This paper describes the progress of world-wide research on institutional design, , both on the level 
of the regulatory regime as well as on the level of the  governance of the relation between authority 
and operator of public transport services. Tendering has found its way into regulatory frameworks 
and has become a mainstay of governance. A first conclusion is that tendering has become mature, 
with consequences for existing and new implementations, with refined and contextual lessons 
coming from research.  A second conclusion shows that governance design should intelligently 
balance including power and control oriented elements with empathic and cooperation oriented 
elements. A first framework for the analysis of this balance is provided in this paper.  
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1. Introduction 
This workshop examined the interface between authority and operator, their respective roles and 
responsibilities and the governance tools used to develop a fruitful interaction. The workshop looked 
at both regulatory regimes and the governance of the relation between authority and operator, 
from public operators, through licensing, direct award, yardstick competition, competitive tendering, 
open markets and mixed models. It continued and developed the themes emerging from Workshop 
5 in Thredbo 13 in Oxford, UK. These might be summarized as follows: 
x Specifying concessions that are attractive to potential bidders 
x Providing adequate data to all bidders 
x Retaining risks that the operator cannot control 
x Ensuring that bidders can acquire the assets they need, if necessary by leasing them to 
the operator themselves 
The following countries were represented in the Workshop, which had 30 participants and 18 
papers: 
x Australia, Brazil, Chili, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Russia, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and many more.  
In section 2 below we review the contribution of the papers presented at the workshop, before 
discussing policy recommendations and areas for future research. 
 
2. Overview of the papers presented 
In total 18 papers were presented and discussed, in four blocks of closely related papers: 
1. Cases of country and modal experiences, mostly with transitions to a new regulatory or 
governance model  
2. Formal evaluations of efficiency, productivity and welfare when changing governance for 
rail and bus services 
3. Specific aspects and evaluations of governance, risks, transactions costs and governance 
failures leading to legal action  
4. Comparative governance analysis and evaluative frameworks  
The key results from these papers are summarised below. 
 
2.1 Cases of country and modal experiences, transitions  
Based on experience from contract re-negotiations of Transantiago (in 2012 and 2013) Errazuriz and 
Hutt address the question of how to achieve the right balance between public and private sector 
participation. A key finding is that the decision on public versus private involvement depends on the 
both the income level of a country (its stage of development) and also political factors. For example, 
in richer countries funding exists to provide services; thus political factors determine how much 
public and how much private (for example, the UK chooses a higher proportion of private sector 
participation than Germany). On the other hand emerging countries might see increased use of 
private sector companies, where the need for funds to invest in public transport offers good 
investment opportunities for the private sector.  
San Goh, Swee and Low describe the move towards greater state ownership of assets and risk in 
^ŝŶŐĂƉŽƌĞ ?ƐƌĂŝůĂŶĚďƵƐƐĞĐƚŽƌƐ ?It was noted that the two main drivers of these changes have been 
the desire to improve services whilst maintaining financial sustainability for operators and at the 
same time by taking ownership of assets (and reducing entry barriers) increase contestability (which 
in time would be expected to lead to improved efficiency). Another key factor is that the Public 
Transport Authority looked carefully at the reforms undertaken in other countries before designing 
its policy approach. It is perhaps too soon to tell what the impacts of these reforms will be however. 
Antitila used a mix of survey based research (with PTAs, companies and bus manufacturers) and 
quantitative research on the impact of competitive tendering to study the regulatory reform of 
Finnish bus services in 2013/14. It was found that in urban areas, most interest was in middle-sized 
tenders, with smaller and larger tenders only generating around 2 bids per tender. In rural areas 
there was competition only for small tenders (1-2 buses). Apart from one totally new company, in 
general interest only came from local bidders. This was explained by the fact that there were too 
many tenders being let at once and also because of lack of familiarity with the new tendering 
approach. In general operators preferred gross cost contracts and having a range of different sizes of 
tender packages was also helpful in stimulating competition. 
In his first paper Veeneman surveyed PTAs in the Netherlands. In an effort to gather the key lessons 
of an already mature tendering market, he asked what key changes they had made to their approach 
when moving from one round of tenders to the next. It was found that there had been a trend 
towards fewer, larger contracts and importantly to combining rail and bus services in one tender in 
some cases. It was also noted that the bidding process tends to focus on existing services  ? and once 
the winning bidder is announced the winner then discusses with the PTA how to develop future 
services. It was also noted that changes in technology (e.g. dial a ride, car and ride share) meant that 
PTAs were reluctant to commit to long franchises. A model of developing the contract to reflect the 
degree of maturity was highlighted; where a gross contract is optimal initially to ensure delivery, 
with a subsequent move to net cost or other incentive contracts (over time these would also need to 
evolve to resolve their weaknesses). [note I could not find your paper in the pack so this is just based 
on my notes] 
Finally in this section, Preston took a look back at passenger rail franchising policy in Britain since its 
inception in the 1990s. He concludes that rail services may be less amenable to contracting out, due 
to instability in service requirements (rail passenger numbers have more than doubled since the 
mid-1990s), high sunk costs and technological issues relating to rolling stock, train control and 
electrification. There have been substantive issues in letting franchises and then enforcing delivery, 
particularly for inter-city services. He also notes that the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) 
is advocating open-access competition at least for inter-city services; partly because of the failures of 
rail franchising in Britain. 
2.2 Formal evaluations of efficiency, productivity and welfare when changing governance: rail  
Smith, Benedetto and Nash explored the extent to which regulatory reforms in railways in Europe 
had impacted on costs (via the expected mechanisms of regulation of the infrastructure manager 
and enabling stronger competition). They extracted the regulatory reform aspects of the IBM Rail 
Liberalisation Index to generate a rail regulation index that was included in a cost function model. 
They find that strong economic regulation, combined with vertical separation, tends to reduce costs 
(whereas strong regulation in a more integrated environment is less effective in terms of cost 
reduction). They also note that strong regulation can overcome some of the negative consequences 
of vertical separation at high traffic density levels noted by Mizutani et. al. (2015). 
Mizutani studied the impact of yardstick regulation on rail operator productivity in Japan. Overall 
their paper finds that yardstick regulation (applied only to large railways but not smaller ones) does 
not appear to have led to improved productivity performance or average cost reduction. However 
the authors do find some differences in TFP trends for different activities (train services versus track 
activities within the vertically integrated companies). A key factor affecting Japanese railways and 
some markets in particular has been falling passenger-km over the period of the study.  
Finally in this sub-section, Dementiev develops a model to determine the optimal corporate 
structure of a partnership between a public body and a private (monopoly) operator. A number of 
such partnerships emerged in Russian railways in recent years. Based on the theoretical model the 
paper finds that social welfare can be improved by local authorities delegating fare setting and 
subsidy decisions to partnerships with a particular corporate structure. It was found that the 
potential proceeds from selling the publicly-owned stake in the partnership could create a useful 
dynamic that leads to more business-oriented decisions. 
 2.3 Formal evaluations of efficiency, productivity and welfare when changing governance: bus  
Sakai ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐĨŽƌ:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐůǇ-owned bus sector. 
It was noted that the sector was under considerable pressure resulting in operating deficits. The 
reforms have involved the contracting out of a sub-set of the service operations to private firms 
(though only operators in that region are allowed to bid). The impact of these reforms are studied 
econometrically based on a translog cost function. It was found that the policy had led to lower costs 
(with the reduction being higher where there is a higher proportion of contracting) 
In a study of Swedish public transport Vigren compares the efficiency of 21 PTAs in 2013 (282 
contracts). Costs increased substantially during the previous decade; thus the paper explores the 
impact of different contractual approaches on cost efficiency and what factors affect efficiency using 
a stochastic frontier model.  Where direct awards are used cost efficiency is found to be lower 
although on a weighted average basis there was little evidence of much variation between the PTAs 
in efficiency performance. Interestingly high density operations were associated with low efficiency; 
which the author postulates might be due to the need to provide for peak services. Measures to 
even out the peak through pricing might be advantageous from a cost efficiency perspective.  
Finally in this sub-section, Svendsen, Hervik and Odeck consider how the organisation of tendering 
(internal or external) impacts on technical efficiency. The study uses Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) and second stage regression modelling to reach its findings. It is found that having less 
competitive tendering increases technical efficiency (an unexpected finding); it is also found that 
outsourcing the competitive tendering process leads to higher technical efficiency. The period 
studied was 2006-2013. 
2.4 Specific aspects and evaluations of governance, risks, transactions costs and governance failures 
leading to legal action  
Hensher, Mulley and Ho quantify the trade-offs that might be made between bid price and the 
disruption associated with changing to a new operator. Based on this information it is possible for 
evaluation committees (in principle) to adjust bids to take account of this factor, though the extent 
of the adjustment depends on the risk aversion of the committee. It was noted that in the sample 
studied only 44% of evaluation committees took account of reputation in their tender award 
decision.  
 
Wegelin and Arx compare the transaction costs of different regional rail governance models, 
focusing on a comparison between competitive tendering in Germany and the direct award 
approach in Switzerland. They show that transaction costs should not be used as an argument 
against the introduction of competition. Factors determining transaction costs include having 
professional PTAs and trusting relationships (reduce transaction costs) whereas complexity increases 
transaction costs. They suggest that the German model, where transaction costs are manageable, is 
a useful starting point for application in Switzerland though they suggest several modifications.  
Hensher, Ho and Knowles develop a choice experiment to understand the preference of operators 
(mainly bus operators in Australia) for different types of contract. They aim to address a gap in the 
literature with regard to the influence of risk preferences on contract choice. They show that 
knowing operator preferences towards different types of performance based contracts (and their 
different elements) should help in the formulation of an optimal contract design. 
Finally in this sub-section Camén and Fellesson study 321 court judgements relating to procurement 
appeals in Sweden between 2007 and 2015. It is found that unfulfilled requirements is by far the 
most common reason for appeals. The next most common reason relates to challenges to the bid 
evaluation model used. Overall it is found that operators lose more often than they win, with this 
trend becoming even more prevalent in recent years. It is argued that tender authorities need to be 
careful when specifying requirements in contracts to reduce the number of appeals (successful or 
not). Smaller companies, facing bankruptcy, may appeal despite the low chance of success. 
 
2.5 Comparative governance analysis and evaluative frameworks 
Hirschhorn and Veeneman develop a framework for mapping institutional roles and designing 
reforms which is tested through two cases (Sao Paulo and Amsterdam). One finding from analysing 
the case studies is that governance of public transport systems needs to include institutions that (i) 
represent fragmented stakeholders; (ii) secure public values such as safety; (iii) coordinate service 
aspects over concessions, layers of government / jurisdictions (e.g. relating to ticketing, information, 
connections, construction works); and (iv) provide service resources (infrastructure; vehicles). Future 
developments in the framework need to consider, inter alia, addressing the multi-layered character 
of governance.  
In his second paper Veeneman develops a framework to analyse the coordination between rail 
network providers and train service operators. Resulting from European legislation and adopted in 
other places in the world, network providers and service operators have been separated, so called 
unbundling. This allows for more competition, as access for other train service operators can now be 
indiscriminatory. Earlier research has shown that the reduced coordination between these to 
entities can reduce the quality of decision making on disruption management and on investment 
decisions spanning rails and trains. A possible answer could be bringing the two together again 
under one management. Veeneman proposes a framework to analyse the (potential for) 
coordination between the two that looks at a wider set of coordinative mechanisms, including and 
beyond hierarchical management. This would allow for both a more mature analysis of coordination 
in more competition driven markets as well as a wider set possible coordinative tools when 
confronted with the downsides of unbundling.  
Finally, in this sub-section, Pedro and Macário review public transport contracts from across the 
world with a view to providing guidance on appropriate contractual approaches for BRT systems. 
dŚĞǇŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƉƵďůŝĐƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚŝƐŝŶĂ “ƉŚĂƐĞŽĨĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐĂŶĚĂĐĐĞůĞƌĂƚĞĚĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞ
ǁŽƌůĚ ? ?Key issues highlighted include division of responsibilities between national and local 
authorities, financial organisation, operator relationships with PTAs and the benefits of using 
competitive pressures alongside or instead of regulation. The paper notes the general trend towards 
tendering and privatisation. They argue that further research is needed to ensure successful 
contracts in future reforms. 
3. Discussion and policy recommendations 
At the beginning of the workshop the following questions were posed. The first question looked at 
the variety of models of governance we are presented with, both regulatory and contracting 
elements. The workshop showed a variety of models with tendering still being one major topic of 
research and an attractive option allowing the integration of government control and private 
competition. The most striking feature of the discussion is the maturity of tendering. To some extent 
it seems that research has a hard time keeping up, as standard evaluations pre and post introduction 
of tendering are not catered to the tuning that has been going on. The Singapore Land Transport 
Authority showed in their presentations how fine-tuned their introduction of tendering was. For 
Santiago de Chile it was clear that in their third iteration of improving the contracts it was necessary 
to further improve the effectiveness of the tendering regime. In Norway the discovery was that 
municipalities working together in a single transport authority were more efficient in providing 
public transport services than municipalities  working by themselves. In Finland, tendering was seen 
as mature enough to introduce it at once in the whole country. In Australia, a detailed look was 
given to the preferences of accessors of bids, looking beyond the expectation that awarding systems 
trigger purely objective evaluations. In Japan, competition is limited to local operating companies, 
with an expected negative effect on efficiency. However, the long-term relation created trust and 
commitment, which provided a positive effect, especially useful in a situation where assets remain in 
the hands of the authorities. The discussion showed examples of functioning governance refraining 
from competition in Australia, Netherlands, Japan, Switzerland and Russia. Both in Japan and the 
Netherlands the benchmarking effect of tendering was made clear on concessions that were not 
tendered out.  
In the discussion it became also clear that objectivity in evaluating bids is needed, but there also 
should be a place for subjectivity. Some aspects of the bidding company are hard to objectively 
compare a priori the awarding of the concession. The rigid European focus on objectivity seems to 
disable the inclusion of those aspects, even though they can be prime predictors of the performance 
of the operators. Swedish research showed that in the European context operators often appeal 
against that rewarding system, but more so because of mapping the requirements to their or other 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŽƌ ?ƐďŝĚƐ ?ůƐŽŝŶZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƚŚĞƚŚĞůĞĂƐing of facilities was contested in court. The research 
presented in the course of the workshop indicated the potential importance of including recognition 
of transition costs in the evaluation process itself.  
Tendering is maturing in a process focussing more and more on detailed design choices. This is a 
process that research should be following. Research should be following this lead by understanding 
the detailed effect of specific design elements of a tendering procedure or context. A key discussion 
point in that context was also the cultural differences that drive the potential effect of tendering. In 
Australia operators do not tend to go to court against authorities, in Sweden it is normal. In 
Switzerland public support for public transport is undisputed, which is not the case in Germany.  In 
Japan and Switzerland, the focus is very much on the long-term, including long-term relations with 
operators. In the UK, Netherlands and Scandinavian countries the planning boundary is given by the 
length of the concession, looking no further than 10 years ahead. In Japan, the importance of 
maintaining government owned assets in a good condition is recognised naturally even by the 
private operators, whereas in Australia running down these assets at the end of a concession needs 
to be contractually prevented.  In the Netherlands, town and country planning and public transport 
planning go hand in hand, in Brazil, this is far less so.  
In addition, tendering seems to have reached a saturation point. The benefits in terms of efficiency 
quickly materialise after the transition to tendering, but after that the gains of the governance 
model level off and it also shows its quirks. In the comparative studies from Australia, Switzerland 
and Russia, other governance forms showed relative good performance and specific advantages over 
tendering. A Swedish example shows that tendered concessions actually showed lower technical 
efficiency.  Tendering for a long time has been seen as a governance form that effectively could 
combine government demands and competition between private operators.  It has delivered on 
that, but has not been the panacea that might have been expected. New Zealand is still planning its 
selective tendering approach, where the benefits should be harvested by tendering poorly 
performing operators, while the long-term relationship can be fostered with operators that are 
doing relatively well. In general it could be said that the efficiency benefits of tendering may be 
particularly felt where performance is lagging (which may well be in the first round of tendering); 
whereas models more based on partnership are more appropriate when performance is sound.  
 
Another discussion point has been the ownership of assets, both in tendering and non-tendering 
environments. Capital is generally cheaper for governmental agencies, which makes their 
investments in assets cheaper. In addition, substantial risks related to these investments for private 
parties can be highly consequential, in effect threatening the continuity of the company. For 
government agencies this is less true. As stated earlier, differences exist between countries, not just 
institutionally but also culturally, in the way in which the interaction between the operator and the 
authorities play out. A key example was the difference between Japanese and Australian operators 
in the way they looked at maintaining vehicles at the end of concession, one being driven by pride 
and honour, the other by contractual agreements. 
4. Recommendations for future research 
In terms of future research, the workshop would point at four distinct ways forward. First of all, it 
has become clear what the value of tendering is: it (potentially) provides an improvement of 
efficiency, not only for tendered concessions, but also for concessions that can be benchmarked 
against the tendered concessions. Consequently, the line of research that looks at ex post analysis of 
tendering needs to focus on understanding the factors that ensure that the expected benefits of 
tendering are indeed captured (and if not, why not). As tendering becomes more mature, research 
can aim at more detailed design choices that have the potential to improve tendering towards and 
beyond improved efficiency. The examples we saw that pointed the way was the research on the 
possible biases of evaluators and the effect of cooperative or unitary authorities. This is a first way 
forward.  
A second way forward is the clever use of competitive tendering in a wider context. New Zealand is 
showing the way in terms of institutionalising the combination of tendering and direct awards. Other 
countries like Netherlands, Australia and Japan have stumbled in the effectiveness of mixed forms. 
Research could move towards evaluating the effect 
The introduction of tendering is a combined set of changes in the governance; it includes a new 
distribution of tasks between public and private sector, governments drawing up explicit 
requirements, operators being explicit in their bids, competition between operators along a 
predesigned awarding system, contracts based on the explicit bids of the operators with specific  
incentives, and a concession management approach defining the relation between the operator and 
the authority in the concession period. A third way forward is to deconstruct these elements of 
tendering and understand their respective effects on the behaviour of operator and authority to get 
a more fundamental understanding of different governance elements on the performance. 
Tendering is just a very specific combination of these elements, which can be researched separately 
to design fundamentally innovative governance forms.  
 
Figure 1 Imposing and influencing governance modes in the chain of interactions between key decision-makers in public 
transport (C is citizen, P is politics, A is authority, O is operator, T is traveller) 
Finally, all governance models, including tendering, institutionalise the relation between the 
principal (the authority) and the agent (the operator) in two distinct modes. On the one hand, the 
principal is trying to impose its will on the agent, where the competitive tendering between the 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŽƌƐŝƐĚƌŝǀŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚĚŽŶ ?ƚĐŽŵƉůǇ ?dŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉal is focusing on controlling the agent. 
On the other hand, the principal needs to understand and work with the agent. The principal has to 
formulate requirements that are realistic, otherwise no bids will come in. During the concession 
period, principal and agent have to work together in partnership to provide the best service to the 
traveller. These two modes, unilateral imposing and multilateral influencing, are also recognizable in 
the other relations in the decision-making chain in public transport, from voting citizens through 
prioritizing politicians, planning agencies, service supplying operators, and service demanding 
travellers (see figure 1). How to balance the two modes in an institutionalisation of all the 
interactions between the decision-makers mentioned could be an important research question, in 
law between citizens and politics, in procedures between politics and authorities, in contracts 
between authorities and operators, and in charters between operators and travellers.   
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